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States, and that its implications extend much further than is generally realized.
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INTRODUCTION
Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC Treaty or Treaty) provides as follows:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether
general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations
arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by
the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could je-
opardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.'
This Article suggests that Article 5 imposes a wide variety
of important duties on Member States, and that its implica-
tions extend much further than is generally realized. The sig-
nificance of Article 5 tends to be underestimated for several
reasons: (1) it is a general principle that is also expressed in
special Articles to cover specific situations (such as Article 90
and Article 116 of the Treaty); (2) the Court ofJustice (Court)
does not always refer specifically to Article 5 as the basis for its
holdings; and (3) Article 5 is not often relied on by lawyers in
concrete situations because of its general terms. Additionally,
in an early Article 5 case, the Court found that Article 5 "lays
down a general duty for the Member States, the actual tenor of
which depends in each individual case on the provisions of the
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1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, art. 5, March 25,
1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-Il) (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S.
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Treaty or on the rules derived from its general scheme."' 2 This
sentence was sometimes understood to imply that Article 5 in
itself had few practical consequences. It is now clear that any
such conclusion would have been wrong.
The developing case law of the Court illustrates the vari-
ety and importance of the duties imposed on Member States
by Article 5. Some of these duties overlap with one another,
and could be differently described or classified. No doubt all
of the implications of Article 5 cannot yet be seen. As with
Article 100, its practical consequences will evolve over time as
circumstances change.
However, this Article suggests that Article 5 imposes a
duty on national authorities to comply with the "general prin-
ciples of law," such as proportionality and legal certainty,
when acting within the Community law sphere. This Article
also suggests, in circumstances in which the court has not yet
had a chance to clarify, that Article 5 has the effect of transfer-
ring competence over certain areas of law from the Member
States to the Community. For these two reasons, Article 5 is of
fundamental importance to the Community's constitutional
law. It binds Member States to observe principles of funda-
mental rights.
Article 5 applies to all national authorities, whether exer-
cising legislative, executive, or judicial powers, and to State en-
terprises, as well as to regional and local authorities. Of
course, each Member State may decide which national author-
ity is responsible for carrying out any particular duty under
Community law,3 but it is important that Article 5 applies fully
2. Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmirkte GmbH, Case
78/70, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 499, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8106; Geddo v. Ente Na-
zionate Risi, Case 2/73, 1973 E.C.R. 865, 878, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8219; Bulk
Oil v. Sun International, Case 2/73, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,288 (conclusions of the Advocate General); Commission v. Hellenic Republic,
Case 192/84, 1985 E.C.R. - (para. 19 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,231.
3. International Fruit Co. NV v. Produkschap voor Groenten en Fruit, Joined
Cases 51-54/71, 1971 E.C.R. 1107, 1115-16, paras. 3-4, 1122 (conclusions of the
Advocate General); Amsterdam Bulb B.V. v. Produktschap Voor Siergewassen, Case
50/76, 1977 E.C.R. 137, para. 32, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8391; Atalanta Amster-
dam B.V. v. Produktschap Voor Vee en Vlees, Case 240/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2137, para.
5, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8594.
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to national courts,4 subject to their duties under Article 177,
because they may decide whether and how to give effect to any
rule of national law that is incompatible with a Member State's
Article 5 duties. The importance of the distinction between
rules of Community law that are directly applicable and those
which are not may be reduced if the national courts are bound
by Article 5 not to breach the obligations that are binding on
the Member State. It is also important that Member States are
not free to perform a Community law obligation in such a man-
ner that it is incompletely or ineffectively implemented in their
national courts.5
In three 1973 cases6 the Court stated that Article 5 and
Article 107, which concern national policies on rates of ex-
change, allow Member States to determine that the obligations
resulting from those Articles cannot confer rights on inter-
ested parties that national courts are bound to protect. This
does not mean, however, that Article 5 cannot have other di-
rect effects.
In one of the Leclerc cases the Advocate General stated that
"Article 5 does more than merely set out a programme which
is relevant solely in the determination of the objectives of the
other provisions of the Treaty."7 The Advocate General noted
that Article 5 contains two general duties and one general pro-
hibition whose actual substance depends on obligations and
prohibitions set forth elsewhere in the Treaty or arising out of
measures adopted by Community institutions even when they
are not directly applicable. However, as the Court has confirmed
on numerous occasions,' "the wording of the second and third
sentences of Article 5 indicates that the duties of cooperation
4. Harz v. Deutsche Tradax, Case 79/83, 1984 E.C.R. 1921, 1942, para. 26,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,093.
5. Id. at 1939-42, paras. 15, 18, 23-28; Von Colson & Kamann v. Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, 1984 E.C.R. 1891, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,092.
6. Firma Carl Schliiter v. Hauptzollamt Lrrach, Case 9/73, 1973 E.C.R. 1135,
para. 39, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8233; Rewe-Zentral v. Hauptzollamt Kehl, Case
10/73, 1973 E.C.R. 1175, para. 26, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8234; Giuseppe
Sacchi, Preliminary Ruling Requested by the Tribunal di Biella, 1974 E.C.R. 409, 435
(conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8267.
7. Centre Leclerc v. Au Ble Vert, Case 231/83, 1985 E.C.R. - (conclusions of
the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111.
8. See, e.g., Deutsche Grammaphon v. Metro, Case 78/70, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 499,
para. 5; INNO v. ATAB, Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, 2144-45, paras. 30, 31, 36,
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imposed on the Member States by that article may under cer-
tain circumstances transcend specific legally binding duties laid down
elsewhere."9 The Advocate General noted that "it must be pos-
sible to deduce from the general scheme of the Treaty or from
other relevant sources a definition of the general duties laid
down in Article 5."'o This Article attempts to define and class-
ify these "general duties" under Article 5.1
I. THE DUTY TO GIVE FULL EFFECT
TO COMMUNITY L4 W
Article 5 obligates Member States to take all necessary
steps to give full effect to Community law. The Court has
stated:
According to the general principles on which the institu-
tional system of the Community is based and which governs
the relations between the Community and the Member
States, it is for the Member States, by virtue of Article 5 of
the Treaty, to ensure that Community regulations, particu-
larly those concerning the common agricultural policy, are
implemented within their territory. Insofar as Community
37; French Republic v. United Kingdom, Case 141/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2923, 2942, para.
8.
9. Centre Leclerc v. Au B16 Vert, Case 231/83, 1985 E.C.R. - (conclusions of
the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111.
10. Id.
11. In a recent case on Article 5 the Court stated:
According to a consistent line of decisions of the Court, a provision
produces direct effect in relations between the Member States and their sub-
jects only if it is clear and unconditional and not contingent on any discre-
tionary implementing measure.
Those requirements are not fulfilled with regard to the obligation at issue in these
proceedings, namely the obligation arising from Article 5 of the EEC Treaty to
refrain from any unilateral measure that would interfere with the system
adopted for financing the Community and apportioning financial burdens
between the Member States. The differences which exist in that respect be-
tween the practices of the Member States concerning the detailed rules and
procedures for exempting teachers from domestic taxation show that the
substance of that obligation is not sufficiently precise. It is for each Member
State concerned to determine the method by which it chooses to prevent its
tax treatment of teachers at the European Schools from producing detri-
mental effects for the system of financing the Community and apportioning
financial burdens between the Member States.
Hurd v. Jones (Inspector of Taxes), Case 44/84, 1986 E.C.R. - (paras. 47-48 of the
judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,283 (emphasis added). It is noteworthy
that the Court did not find that Article 5 can never have direct effects, but only that it
had none in this particular case.
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law, including its general principles, does not include com-
mon rules to this effect, the national authorities when im-
plementing Community regulations act in accordance with
the procedural and substantive rules of their own national
law. However, as the Court stated in its judgment of 6 June
1972 in .. .Schluter & Maack v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg Jonas
.... this rule must be reconciled with the need to apply
Community law uniformly so as to avoid unequal treatment
of producers and traders .... 2
In the Italian fruit trees case (Commission v. Italy), the Court
stated that
A Member State cannot plead the provisions or practices of
its internal order in order to justify failure to observe obli-
gations and time-limits arising from Community Regula-
tions.
It falls to a Member State in accordance with the general
obligations imposed on Member States by Article 5 of the
Treaty, to recognize the consequences, in its internal order,
of its adherence to the Community and, if necessary, to
adapt its procedures for budgetary provision in such a way
that they do not form an obstacle to the implementation,
within the prescribed time-limits, of its obligations within
the framework of the Treaty.' 3
The duty to give full effect to Community law means that
"all the institutions of the Member State concerned must...
ensure within the fields covered by their respective powers,
that judgments of the Court are complied with."' 4 This duty is
based on Article 171 of the EEC Treaty. It obligates legisla-
12. Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Fed. Rep. of Germany, Joined Cases 205-
215/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2633, 2665-66, paras. 17, 19, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111
(citation omitted); see also id. at 2666, paras. 22-23, 2680, 2683 (conclusions of the
Advocate General); Firma Wilhelm Fromme v. Bundesanhalt fur landwirtschafliche
Marktordnung, Case 54/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1449, 1469, 1477-78 (conclusions of the
Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8835; Commission v. Belgium, Case
137/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2393, 2407, para. 9, 2413, 2414, 2416 (conclusions of the Advo-
cate General); Scheer v. Einfur-und Vorratsstelle Getreide, Case 30/70, 1970 E.C.R.
1197, para. 10, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8129.
13. Commission v. Italian Republic, Case 30/72, 1973 E.C.R. 161, 172 Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8207; see also Leonesio v. Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry of
the Italian Republic, Case 93/71, 1972 E.C.R. 287, 295-296, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8175; Salumificio di Cornuda v. Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato,
1979 E.C.R. 867, para. 27, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8557.
14. Procureur de la Republique v. Waterkeyn, Joined Cases 314-316/81 &
83/82, 1982 E.C.R. 4337, para. 14, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8889.
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tures to amend or repeal a national measure that is incompati-
ble with Community law. Member States also must not give
effect to arbitral awards if the awards are contrary to, or unen-
forceable under, Community law, including Community com-
petition law. 15 In addition, the duty to give full effect requires
Member States not to interfere with firms and individuals exer-
cising their rights under Community law (including the right to
complain about Member States to the Commission), by, for ex-
ample, making the exercise conditional upon waiver of other
rights or acceptance of additional obligations,' 6 or by penaliz-
ing firms that exercise their rights.
In addition, the duty to give full effect requires national
courts to comply with judgments of the Court, even, it is sub-
mitted, if the rule on which the judgment is based is not di-
rectly applicable.' 7 The duty may go further. National courts
might have a duty not to enforce national policies or measures
that are contrary to Community law, as when, for example, na-
tional policies are implemented by private contracts and the
national courts must decide whether to give effect to those
contracts. National courts themselves are bound by Article 5,
and they have a duty, within the limits of their jurisdiction, to
ensure that no effect is given to Member States' policies which
are contrary to Community law. Article 5 is also the basis for
the duty of national courts to raise points of Community law
sua sponte.
II. THE DUTY TO IMPLEMENT COMMUNITY
OBJECTIVES
Member States have a duty under Article 5 to implement
15. Comm'n, Tenth Report on Competition Policy 19 (1981) (in connection
with the International Energy Agency Dispute Settlement Centre); see Yoga Fruit Juices
Case, 1969 Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb 504 (Bundesgerichtshof), 1969 Comm. Mkt.
L. Rep. 123; Pescatore, Interpretation of Community Law and the Doctrine of "Acte clair," in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 33 (Bathurst, Simmonds,
Hunnings & Welch eds. 1972).
16. See Commission v. U.K., Case 32/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2403, 2419, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8692 (argument of the Commission).
17. Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, Case 148/78, 1979 E.C.R. 1629, paras. 17-23,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8569; Becker v. Finanzamt Miunster-Innenstadt, Case
8/81, 1982 E.C.R. 53, para. 21, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8789; Regina v. Tymen,
Case 269/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3079, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8793.
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Community objectives when the objective and the required ac-
tion are sufficiently clear. In Thieffry, the Court stated:
[F]reedom of establishment, subject to observance of pro-
fessional rules justified by the general good, is one of the
objectives of the Treaty.
In so far as Community law makes no special provision,
these objectives may be attained by measures enacted by
the Member States, which under Article 5 of the Treaty are
bound to take 'all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising
out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the insti-
tutions of the Community', and to abstain "from any mea-
sure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives
of this Treaty."
Consequently, if the freedom of establishment provided for
by Article 52 can be ensured in a Member State either
under the provisions of the laws and regulations in force, or
by virtue of the practices of the public service or of profes-
sional bodies, a person subject to Community law cannot be
denied the practical benefit of that freedom solely by virtue
of the fact that, for a particular profession, the directives
provided for by Article 57 of the Treaty have not yet been
adopted.
Since the practical enjoyment of freedom of establishment
can thus in certain circumstances depend upon national
practice or legislation, it is incumbent upon the competent
public authorities-including legally recognized profes-
sional bodies-to ensure that such practice or legislation is
applied in accordance with the objective defined by the pro-
visions of the Treaty relating to freedom of establishment.' 8
In connection with the Mourne fishery, in one of the UK
fisheries cases, the question arose whether a Member State had
a legal duty under Article 5 to adopt measures to ensure the
conservation of a certain stock of fish, in light of scientific ad-
vice that a ban on fishing was needed to conserve the stock.
The Court stated:
ITlhere are several factors which, when taken together, lead
to the conclusion that the United Kingdom was under a
duty to take conservation measures in the zone in question
... it is not in dispute that according to the available scien-
18. Thieffry v. Conseil De L'Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris, Case 71/76,
1977 E.C.R. 765, 777-78, paras. 15-18, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8396.
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tific opinions recognized by all parties a total ban on fishing
was required for the conservation of the Mourne stock...
both Article 102 of the Act of Accession and Council Regu-
lation (EEC) No. 101/76, in particular Article 4 thereof, in
the same way as Annex VI to the Hague Resolution and the
Council declaration of 31 January 1978, are based on the
twofold assumption that measures must be adopted in the
maritime waters for which the Community is responsible so
as to meet established conservation needs and that if those
measures cannot be introduced in good time on a Commu-
nity basis the Member States not only have the right but are
also under a duty to act in the interest of the Community...
The measure introduced by the United Kingdom . . .ac-
knowledges, albeit belatedly, the United Kingdom's duty to
introduce in this fishing zone a conservation measure ap-
propriate to the seriousness of the danger to the existence
of the fish stocks in question.1 9
It follows that if clear scientific advice dictates that a given
measure is necessary for the conservation of a biological re-
source, Article 5 imposes a legally binding duty to take the
measure, if the resource is one that the Community aims to
conserve, for example, marine biological resources, or wild
birds.
When one of the purposes of a Community measure is to
eliminate distortions of competition, and distortions will arise
if exchange rates change significantly, Member States are obli-
gated to take appropriate counter measures.2 0 This duty can
only be based on Article 5.
If a Community measure contemplates supplementary
Community measures, and none have yet been adopted, Arti-
cle 5 imposes a duty on Member States to adopt national meas-
19. Commission v. U.K., Case 32/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2403, 2437-38, 2460-61 (con-
clusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8692; see also Commis-
sion v. U.K., Case 804/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, 1089 (conclusions of the Advocate
General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8752; Commission v. Council (AETR), Case
22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263, para. 90, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8134 (duty of Member
States to act in interests of Community); Officer van justite v. van Dam, Case 124/80,
1981 E.C.R. 1447, 1463-65 (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8763.
20. Criminal Proceedings Against Petrus Suys, Case 32/82, 1982 E.C.R. 4111,
paras. 21-23, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8763.
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ures on behalf of the Community. 21 This duty may exist even
when the Member States no longer have any competence of
their own to adopt national measures for any other purpose.22
III. THE DUTY NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE
OPERA TION OF COMMUNITY LA W RULES
The obligation of Member States not to take action that
interferes with the operation of Community law is clearly
demonstrated in a long line of cases, mostly involving the com-
mon agricultural policy rules. 23 This obligation involves not
merely the avoidance of measures that formally conflict with
Community rules, but also avoiding measures that interfere
with their operation. This obligation arises from Article 5.24
(As will be discussed below, there are some indications that
this rule is one of competence rather than conflict.25)
21. In re Pluimveeslachterij Midden-Nederta BV & Pluim, Joined Cases 47 &
48/83, 1984 E.C.R. 1721, paras. 22-23, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,087.
22. Commission v. U.K., Case 804/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, para. 30, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8752.
23. Deuka v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide, Case 31/74, 1975 E.C.R. 421,
427, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8354; Ex Parte Tasca, Case 65/75, 1976 E.C.R. 291,
paras. 1-4, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8354; Sadam v. Comitato Interministeriale dei
Prezzi, Joined Cases 88-90/75, 1976 E.C.R. 323, paras. 1-4, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8355; Amsterdam Bulb, Case 50/76, 1977 E.C.R. 137, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $$
8391, 8406; Procureur du Roi v. Dechmann, Case 154/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1573, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8504; Grosoli, Case 223/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2621, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8603; Openbaar Ministerie v. Danis, Joined Cases 16-20/79, 1979 E.C.R.
3327, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8614; Procureur du Roi v. Kefer & Delmelle, Joined
Cases 95 & 96/79, 1980 E.C.R. 103, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8632; Pigs Mktg. Bd.
v. Redmond, Case 83/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2347, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8559; Pigs &
Bacon Comm'n v. McCarren, Case 177/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2161, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8592; Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Ass'n v. Ireland, Martin Doyle v. An
Taoiseach, Joined Cases 36 & 71/80, 1981 E.C.R. 735, 761-62, para. 15 (conclusions
of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8747; Openbaar Ministerie of
the Netherlands v. Van Tiggle, Case 82/77, 1978 E.C.R. 25, 47 (conclusions of the
Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8461; Russo v. AIMA, Case 60/75,
1976 E.C.R. 45, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8338; Benedetti v. Munari, Case 52/76,
1977 E.C.R. 163, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -.
24. Procureur G~nral v. Buys, Case 5/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3203, para. 30, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8612; French Republic v. U.K., Case 141/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2923,
2948 (opinion of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8609; Galli,
Case 31/74, 1975 E.C.R. 47, 64, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8294; see also Hurd v.
Jones, Inspector of Taxes, Case 44/84, 1986 E.C.R. - (paras. 38-39, 44-45, 48-49,
58 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -.
25. See, e.g., Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Ass'n v. Ireland, Joined Cases 36 &
71/80, 1981 E.C.R. 735, 762 (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8747; Toffoli v. Regione Veneto, Case 10/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3301,
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National authorities therefore must avoid adopting deci-
sions that could conflict with future decisions of Community
decisions, or with the uniform application of Community law
rules, or with the "practical effectiveness" of Community law
rules in particular cases. If the national authority has adopted
a measure that conflicts with a Community decision, the au-
thority must take whatever action is appropriate to eliminate
the conflict. 26
In Leclerc, the Court stated:
[T]he rules on competition are concerned with the conduct
of undertakings and not with the national legislation of
Member States. However, as the Court has recently ruled
in its judgment of 10January 1985, in ... Leclerc .... Mem-
ber States are nonetheless obliged under the second para-
graph of Article 5 of the Treaty not to detract, by means of
national legislation, from the full and uniform application of
Community law or from the effectiveness of its implement-
ing measures; nor may they introduce or maintain in force
measures, even of a legislative nature, which may render in-
effective the competition rules applicable to undertakings.
However, rules such as those concerned in this case are
not intended to compel suppliers and retailers to conclude
agreements or to take any other action of the kind referred
to in Article 85(1) of the Treaty: . . .
In another of the Leclerc cases, the Court explained fur-
ther:
[T]he purely national systems and practices in the book
trade have not yet been made subject to a Community com-
petition policy with which the Member States would be re-
quired to comply by virtue of their duty to abstain from any
measure that might jeopardize the attainment of the objec-
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8615; Cucchi v. Avez S.p.A., Case 77/76, 1977 E.C.R.
987, 1023, paras. 27-35 (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8422; Russo v. Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi, Case 60/75, 1976 E.C.R.
45, 61 (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8338;
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v. Firma Paul G. Bollman, Case 40/69, 1970
E.C.R. 69, para. 4, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8098.
26. Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, Case 14/68, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 13-15,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8056.
27. Cullet v. Centre Leclerc Toulouse, Case 231/83, 1985 E.C.R. - (paras. 16-
18 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139 (citation omitted); see also
Criminal Proceedings against van de Haar & Kaveka, Joined Cases 177 & 178/82,
1984 E.C.R. 1797, para. 24.
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tives of the Treaty. It follows that, as Community law
stands, Member States' obligations under Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty, in conjunction with Articles 3(f) and 85, are
not specific enough to preclude them from enacting legisla-
tion of the type at issue on competition in the retail prices
of books, provided that such legislation is consonant with
the other specific Treaty provisions, in particular those con-
cerning the free movement of goods.28
In other words, when the Commission's policy becomes clear,
Member States could not adopt legislation that would jeopard-
ize the attainment of Community objectives.
In Van Dam, a fisheries case, the Advocate General stated
that when the Council had the competence to pass conserva-
tion measures but had not yet done so, Member States were
obligated,
under Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to take the necessary
conservation measures in the general interest and having re-
gard to the substantive and formal requirements of Com-
munity law .... [T]he interim decisions of the Council...
are merely to be considered as specifying the duty of cooperation
of the Member States in accordance with Article 5 .... [i]f
the Council fails to act the Commission is competent to
grant that approval regardless of whether the decisions in
question are considered a restoration of powers to the
Member States or, on a more correct view, a specification of
their obligations under Article 5 of the EEC Treaty . . .
these decisions . . . merely render specific the Member
States' duty of cooperation, which they undertook in ac-
cordance with Article 5 of the EEC Treaty by their accession
to the Community .... 29
Another example of the duty not to interfere with the op-
eration of Community law is the Variola case. 0 In that case the
Court held that it was an unlawful obstruction of the direct ap-
plicability of a Community regulation for a Member State to
enact national measures reproducing the terms of the regula-
tion. Such an enactment was also unlawful because, as will be
28. Centre Leclerc v. Au BI Vert, Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,111.
29. Officier van Justitie v. Van Dam & Zonen, Case 124/80, 1981 E.C.R. 1447,
1463-65 (emphasis in original), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8763.
30. Variola v. Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, Case 34/73, 1973 E.C.R.
981, 990-91, para. 10, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8226.
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discussed below, it concealed the Community nature of the
legal rule, and so interfered with the jurisdiction of the Court
under Article 177.
IV. THE DUTY NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE
OPERATION OF A COMMUNITY INSTITUTION
Article 5 imposes a duty not to interfere with the opera-
tion of a Community institution. The Court stated in the Lord
Bruce case:
Community law lays down certain limits.., which the Mem-
ber States must observe in the enactment of taxation laws
applicable to Members of the Parliament. Those limits arise
in particular from Article 5 of the EEC Treaty which ...
includes the duty not to take measures which are likely to
interfere with the internal functioning of the institutions of
the Community.3
In the case of Luxembourg v. Parliament the Court stated:
[W]hen the Governments of the Member States make provi-
sional decisions they must, in accordance with the rule im-
posing on Member States and the Community institutions
mutual duties of sincere cooperation, as embodied in partic-
ular in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, have regard to the
power of the Parliament to determine its internal organiza-
tion. They must ensure that such decisions do not impede
the due functioning of the Parliament.
Furthermore the Parliament is authorized, pursuant to the
power to determine its own internal organization given to it
by Article 25 of the ECSC Treaty, Article 142 of the EEC
Treaty and Article 112 of the EAEC Treaty, to adopt appro-
priate measures to ensure the due functioning and conduct
of its proceedings. However, in accordance with the above-
mentioned mutual duties of sincere cooperation, the deci-
sions of the Parliament in turn must have regard to the
power of Governments of the Member States to determine
the seat of the institutions and to the provisional decisions
taken in the meantime.
What is more, it must be emphasized that the powers of the
31. Lord Bruce of Donington v. Aspden, Case 208/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2205, 2218-
2219, para. 14, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8771; accord Commission v. Ireland, Case
61/77R, 1977 E.C.R. 937, para. 26, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8473; Variola, Case
34/73, 1973 E.C.R. 981, para. 11, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8226; see also Hurd,
Case 44/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,283.
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Governments of the Member States in the matter do not
affect the right inherent in the Parliament to discuss any
question concerning the Communities, to adopt resolutions
on such questions and to invite the Governments to act.3 2
It has been suggested that this principle might make the "Lux-
embourg agreement" (under which the Council will act only by
unanimity even when qualified majority voting is envisioned by
the Treaty), contrary to Community law. The legality of the
Luxembourg compromise is an issue that arises primarily
under Article 5.
The principle not to interfere with Community institutions
is particularly applicable when the Council has not yet adopted
common rules3 3 or when the Commission has submitted pro-
posals for urgently needed Community measures.3 4 In such
cases the obligation is more specific; it is a duty not to hinder
the Council in adopting new measures. For example, it may be
unlawful for a Member State to enter into an international ob-
ligation when Council negotiations were going on, or were
about to begin on the same problem.
This principle of Community law was raised by the case
Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Orbison before the Court of Appeal in
England.3 5 Hasselblad sued Orbison for defamation based on
statements by Orbison in a letter to the EEC Commission sug-
gesting that Hasselblad had infringed Article 85, EEC Treaty.
The judgment stated that:
[S]ince this country is a Member of the European Commu-
nity, there is a public interest in ensuring that the Commis-
sion, as the primary authority of the Community [in the
sphere of competition law] should not be frustrated in the
duty imposed on it by the EEC Treaty and Council Regula-
tion 17 of enforcing compliance with Articles 85 and 86
36
If Haaselblad could proceed with such a claim, the Commis-
32. Luxembourg v. European Parliament, Case 230/81, 1983 E.C.R. 255, 287,
para. 37; see also Hurd, Case 44/84, 1986 E.C.R. - (paras. 38-49 of the judgment).
33. French Republic v. U.K., Case 141/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2923, para. 8, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 8609; see also Puimveeslachterij, Joined Cases 47 & 48/83, 1984
E.C.R. 1721, paras. 22-23, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,087.
34. Commission v. U.K., Case 32/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1045, para. 28, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8752.
35. Hasselblad (GB) Ltd. v. Orbison, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 540, 679 (1984).
36. Id. at 692.
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sion would find it more difficult to investigate future breaches
of Articles 85 and 86. If the Commission disclosed complaint
letters knowing they were subjecting the writer to a libel suit,
the supply of information to the Commission would be signifi-
cantly reduced. Additionally, "it cannot be right that national
courts and Community institutions shall both independently
weigh the force of particular evidence with the possibility of
inconsistent results." 37
The argument that the Commission's ability to obtain evi-
dence should not be interfered with is similar to the judgment
of the Court of Justice in Lord Bruce. 8 Another problem, the
risk of inconsistent decisions of national courts and Commu-
nity institutions, is analyzed by the Court of Justice in the Wil-
helm case.3 9
Lord Bruce concerned the "internal functioning" of a Com-
munity institution. Hasselblad extended the principle to the
ability of the institution in question to receive information
from members of the public. This principle might also apply
to submissions to a committee of the European Parliament. In
Luxembourg v. Parliament, as discussed below, the Court went
beyond the express words of Article 5 to find that the Commu-
nity institutions owe each other a duty of cooperation. This
principle could lead to "checks and balances" that might be-
come an important part of the constitutional law of the Com-
munity. The Court also recognized the duty of the Community
institutions towards Member States, illustrating that the idea of
checks and balances is not alien to the passage quoted above.
V. THE DUTY NOT TO ENCOURAGE BREACHES OF
COMMUNITY LA W
Each Member State is obliged not to enable, encourage,
or facilitate a breach by state authorities or private persons of
any rule of Community law, or to allow itself or its courts to be
used to facilitate a breach of Community law. This principle is
derived from both Article 5 and Article 90.40 As stated by the
37. Id.
38. Case 208/80, 1981 E.C.R. 2205, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8771.
39. Case 14/68, 1969 E.C.R. 1, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8056.
40. Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law and Government Measures Relating to Pub-
lic and Privileged Enterprises; Article 90 EEC Treaty, in 1984 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 543
(B. Hawk ed. 1985).
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Court in INNO v. A TAB:
The second paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty provides
that Member States shall abstain from any measure which
could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the
Treaty .... Article 90 provides that, in the case of public
undertakings and undertakings to which Member States
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall
neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary
inter alia to the rules provided for in Articles 85 to 94 ....
Likewise, Member States may not enact measures enabling
private undertakings to escape from the constraints im-
posed by Articles 85 to 94 of the Treaty.
At all events, Article 86 prohibits any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position, even if such abuse is
encouraged by a national legislative provision.4 t
In Procureur General v. Buys, the Advocate General found that it
was clear that "a Member State would be in breach of Article 5
if it enacted legislation calculated to bring about or to en-
courage such agreements, decisions or concerted practices"
(i.e. those contrary to Article 85).42 Additionally, in one of the
Leclerc cases the Advocate General stated:
If by encouraging behavior prohibited by Articles 85 and 86
[a national measures] is, in addition, capable of affecting
trade between Member States . . . it will amount to an in-
41. NV GB-INNO-BM v. ATAB, Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, 2144-45, paras.
30-33, Comm Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8442; see also Cullet v. Centre Leclerc Toulouse,
Case 231/83, 1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139.
In Minist~re Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Fronti~res), a judgment of April 30,
1986, regarding the compatibility of Community law and a national approval proce-
dure for air tariffs, the Court stated that the Treaty imposes a duty on Member States
not to adopt or maintain in force any measure which could deprive Articles 85 and 86
of their effectiveness. "Such would be the case, in particular if a Member State were
to require or favour the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices
contrary to Article 85 or to reinforce the effects thereof." Cases 209-213/84, 1986
E.C.R. - (para. 72 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -. The Court went
on: "It is contrary to the obligations of Member States under Article 5 of the EEC
Treaty, read in conjunction with Articles 3(f) and Article 85, in particular paragraph
(1), of that Treaty, to approve air tariffs and thus to reinforce the effects thereof,
where, in the absence of any rules adopted by the Council in pursuance of Article 87,
it has found in accordance with the forms and procedures laid down in Article 88 or
Article 89(2) that those tariffs are the result of an agreement, a decision by an associ-
ation of undertakings, or a concerted practice contrary to Article 85." Id. at - (para.
77 of the judgment).
42. Procureur G~nral v. Buys, Case 5/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3203, 3226, 3230-31,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8612.
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fringement of Article 3() and the second paragraph of Arti-
cle 5, read with Article 85 or 86....
[A] national measure which deprived of practical effective-
ness the prohibitions directed to undertakings by Articles
85 and 86 or frustrated action by the Commission under
Articles 87 would be in direct conflict with the second para-
graph of Article 5 inasmuch as it would prejudice the objec-
tive assigned to the Community by Article 3(), which aims
at the institution of a system of effective competition in the
Common Market....
[T]hose considerations bring closer to its proper propor-
tions the objection that Article 3(f) merely outlines an aim
while the second paragraph of Article 5 is too general. It is
true that Article 3(f) lays down an objective for the Commu-
nity, but it also sets forth a principle, the fundamental na-
ture of which I have just emphasized. As for the second
paragraph of Article 5, it makes the transfer of powers effected by
the Treaty irreversible. The Member States must comply with
the provisions in question, so as not to render nugatory the
rules of the Treaty which provide for its implementation.
Every time a Member State prevents those provisions from
being applied, its action is liable to deprive individuals of the rights
that they might derive therefrom and prevent the Community in-
stitutions from exercising the prerogatives that the Treaty
confers on them.
I consider that to be the sense of the court's judgment in
INNO v. A TAB: a national measure which encourages beha-
viour in restraint of competition or, more generally, de-
prives of practical effect the prohibitions laid down in Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the Treaty is incompatible with Article 3(f)
and the second paragraph of Article 5, read together with
Articles 85 and 86.
This opinion clarifies one important way in which Article 5
has direct effects, by prohibiting national legislation that inter-
feres with the operation of rules of Community law that them-
selves have direct effects. Furthermore, Member States also
presumably have an obligation under Article 5 not to enact
legislation that encourage State authorites to breach Commu-
nity law. Article 90 of the EEC Treaty, which is directly appli-
cable, suggests that such a rule exists, and therefore the princi-
43. Centre Leclerc v. Au B16 Vert, Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,111 (emphasis supplied).
ARTICLE 5 EEC TREATY
pie is applicable beyond state enterprises. It also follows that
Member States have a duty not to widen the effects of any
breach of Community law by, for example, imposing prices re-
sulting from an unlawful price-fixing agreement on corpora-
tions that were not parties to the agreement.
VI. THE DUTY TO ENFORCE COMMUNITY LAW
Article 5 requires Member States to enforce compliance
with Community law within their jurisdictions in addition to
enforcing compliance with national measures adopted in con-
formity with Community obligations. 44 It is not enough to en-
act legislation or other measures implementing Community di-
rectives. Member States must enforce them as far as necessary
and take all reasonable steps to ensure that citizens, compa-
nies, and public authorities comply. The Article 5 obligations
that Member States must enforce include the obligations of all
those within their jurisdictions. In the Nordsee case, the Court
stated:
The Federal Republic of Gertiany, as a Member State of the
Community responsible for the performance of obligations
arising from Community law within its territory pursuant to
Article 5 and Articles 169 to 171 of the Treaty, has not en-
trusted or left to private individuals the duty of ensuring
that such obligations are complied with .... Community
law must be observed in its entirety throughout the territory
of all the Member States; parties to a contract are not,
therefore, free to create exceptions to it. In that context
attention must be drawn to the fact that if questions of
Community law are raised in an arbitration resorted to by
agreement the ordinary courts may be called upon to ex-
amine them .. .
Therefore, Article 5 imposes on Member States the duty to
provide for whatever administrative, policing, or enforcement
personnel and procedures may be necessary to ensure compli-
ance by all those to whom the rules apply.
The duty to enforce Community law includes the duty to
44. Openbaar Ministi~re v Bout, Case 21/81, 1982 E.C.R. 381, para. 11, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 381; Commission v. Netherlands, Case 96/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1791,
paras. 7, 8, 12, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8840 (measures taken must be binding).
45. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefisherei, Case 102/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1095, 1110-
11, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8822.
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recover from private parties sums of money paid contrary to
Community law. In Fromme, the Court stated:
[A]ctions for the recovery of sums which have been wrongly
paid under Community law must be decided by national
courts in accordance with their own national law in so far as
Community law has not provided otherwise. In particular,
it is for the national authorities to settle all ancillary ques-
tions relating to such recovery, such as the question of pay-
ment of interest ... [This requirement] does no more than
confirm expressly an obligation already incumbent on the
Member States by virtue of the principle of cooperation
enunciated in Article 5 of the Treaty.46
The duty to enforce Community law also includes enforc-
ing the rights of private parties under directly applicable rules
of Community law against the public authorities of the Mem-
ber State itself. This principle was first stated in Rewe47 and
46. Fromme v. Bolin, Case 54/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1449, 1463-64, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8835; Baywa v. Balm, Joined Cases 146, 192 & 193/81, 1982 E.C.R.
1503, para. 23, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8834 (duty to ensure denaturing properly
carried out to qualify for Community grant, prevent irregularities, and recover lost
sums all said to be based on Article 5); Deutsche Milchkontor v. Germany, Joined
Cases 205-215/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2633, 2665-66, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,011;
Amministrazione della Finanze v. Salumi, Joined Cases 66, 127 & 128/79, 1980
E.C.R. 1237, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8663.
However ... the application of national law must not adversely affect the
scope or impair the effectiveness of Community law by making the recovery
of sums wrongly paid impossible in practice. Nor may it make the recovery
of such sums subject to conditions or detailed rules less favourable than
those which apply to similar procedures governed by national law alone. In
such matters the national authorities must proceed with the same care as
they exercise in implementing corresponding national laws so as not to im-
pair, in any way, the effectiveness of Community law .... [W]ith regard to
the relationship to procedures for determining similar, but purely national,
disputes ... the application of national law ... must be affected in a non-
discriminatory manner as compared with those procedures. The rule
against discrimination so enunciated also implies that the obligations im-
posed by national legislation on undertakings which have been wrongly
granted pecuniary advantages based on Community law must not be more
stringent than those imposed on undertakings which have wrongly received
similar advantages based on national law, assuming, however, that the two
groups of recipients are in comparable situations and therefore that that
different treatment is not objectively .justifiable.
Fromme, Case 54/81, 1982 E.C.R. at 1463-64.
47. Rewe-Zentralfinanz, Case 33/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, 1997-98, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8382; Comet v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, 1976
E.C.R. 2043, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8383; lanelli v. Meroni, Case 74/76, 1977
E.C.R. 557, 592 (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
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repeated in other cases concerned with repayment of taxes im-
posed in violation of Community law. However, the language
of Rewe is deliberately broad and is not limited to tax cases, but
extends to actions for declarations, or the equivalent, and to all
claims for compensation against public authorities. In Rewe,
the Court stated:
The prohibition laid down in Article 13 of the Treaty ...
[has] a direct effect and confers on citizens rights which the
national courts are required to protect.
Applying the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5
of the Treaty, it is the national courts which are entrusted
with ensuring the legal protection which citizens derive
from the direct effect of the provisions of Community law.
Accordingly, in the absence of Community rules on this
subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member
State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to de-
termine the procedural conditions governing actions at law
intended to ensure the protection of the rights which citi-
zens have from the direct effect of Community law, it being
understood that such conditions cannot be less favourable
than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature.
In the absence of ... measures of harmonization the right
conferred by Community law must be exercised before the
national courts in accordance with the conditions laid down
by national rules.
The position would be different only if the conditions and
time-limits made it impossible in practice to exercise the
rights which the national courts are obliged to protect.
This is not the case where reasonable periods of limitation
of actions are fixed.
The answer to be given to the first question is therefore that
8401;Just v. Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, Case 68/79, 1980 E.C.R. 501, 522-23, 531
(conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8650; Pigs & Ba-
con Comm'n v. McCarren, Case 177/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2161, 2192, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8592; Ferwerda v. Produktschap Voor Vee En Vlees, Case 265/78, 1980
E.C.R. 617, 629, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8655; Amministrzione Della Finanze v.
Denkavit, Case 61/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1205, 1226, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8731;
Amministrazione Dello Finanze v. Ariete, Case 811/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2545, 2554,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8693; Amministrazione Dello Finanze v. Mireco, Case
826/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2559, 2574, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8694; Lippische
Hauptpenossenschafft v. Balm, Joined Cases 119 & 126/79, 1980 E.C.R. 1863,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8681; Amministrzione Dello Finanze v. San Giorgio, Case
199/82, 1983 E.C.R. 3595, 3612, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,045.
The opinion of the Advocate General in Russo, Case 60/75, 1976 E.C.R. at 62-
63, is particularly clear.
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in the present state of Community law there is nothing to
prevent a citizen who contests before a national court a de-
cision of a national authority on the ground that it is incom-
patible with Community law from being confronted with the
defence that limitation periods laid down by national law
have expired, it being understood that the procedural con-
ditions governing the action may not be less favourable
than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature.48
The duty to enforce Community law also implies that national
courts must provide remedies for individuals and firms injured
by breaches of applicable Community rules when those rules
are binding on the private parties against whom the remedies
are sought.4 9 In addition, this prohibits efforts of private par-
ties to enforce their rights through national courts, for exam-
ple, by enacting procedural rules making it excessively difficult
to obtain evidence of the breach of Community law. It has
been suggested for example that Article 5 might necessitate
amendment of the rule in the UK allowing companies to refuse
to incriminate themselves when sued for breach of Community
competition law.50
VII. THE DUTY TO CLARIFY THE NATIONAL POSITION
UNDER COMMUNITY LA W
When there is a possibility of uncertainty or conflict, Arti-
cle 5 imposes a duty on Member States to clarify its position
under Community law. 51 This may be required as a particular
application of the Community law principle of ensuring legal
certainty with regard to national measures, but it is preferable
to regard it as a separate and specific duty.52 There are several
illustrations of this duty in the case law of the Court, especially
when national law appears to conflict with Community law. In
48. Rewe, Case 33/76, 1976 E.C.R. at 1997-98.
49. Temple Lang, EEC Competition Actions in Member States' Courts-Claims for Dam-
ages Declarations and Injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law, in 1983 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 219-304 (B. Hawk ed. 1984).
50. But see Temple Lang, Proceedings for Damages Before National Courts in Competi-
tion Cases, in EEC LAW AND NORDIC COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH OUR COMMUNITIES
at 187-91 (Sundstr6m, Joutsamo, Sund & Loikkanen eds. 1985).
51. Lord Mackenzie Stuart, Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in Community Law
and English Administrative Law, 1983 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 53, 59 (1983).
52. Amsterdam Bulb, Case 50/76, 1977 E.C.R. 137, paras. 5, 7, 8, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8391; Buys, Case 5/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3203, 3244 (conclusions of the
Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8612.
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addition, the duty to clarify requires national courts to refer
questions of Community law to the Court under Article 177 if
there are conflicting national judgments on the question, in or-
der to reestablish a uniform application of Community law.
This duty to clarify applies primarily when the Community law
rules and the national law rules create rights and duties for
private parties.
VIII. THE EFFECT OF MAKING CERTAIN ACTS BINDING
It is often pointed out by the Court that specific provisions
of Community legislation or the treaties are merely particular
statements of the general duties imposed by Article 5.53 When
the specific provisions are themselves legally binding, the prac-
tical result is normally unaffected by the simultaneous applica-
tion of Article 5. However, if a specific measure would not
otherwise be legally binding, the fact that it is a concrete exam-
ple of a general duty imposed by Article 5 has the effect of
making compliance legally obligatory on Member States.
By way of illustration, Annex VI to certain resolutions
adopted by the Council said that Member States consult the
Commission for its approval when adopting certain fisheries
measures. Being a resolution, this would not normally have
been legally binding. However, the Court stated:
The Commission has rightly claimed that the resolution, in
the particular field to which it applies, makes specific the
duties of co-operation which the Member States assumed
under Article 5 of the EEC Treaty when they acceded to the
Community. Performance of these duties is particularly'
necessary in a situation in which it has appeared impossible,
by reason of divergences of interest which it has not yet
been possible to resolve, to establish a common policy and
in a field such as that of conservation of the biological re-
sources of the sea in which worthwhile results can only be
attained thanks to the co-operation of all the Member
States.54
53. E.g., Deutsche Milchkontor, Joined Cases 205-215/82, 1983 E.C.R. 2633,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14011; Baywa v. Balm,Joined Cases 146, 192, & 193/81,
1982 E.C.R. at 1533, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8834; Commission v. Netherlands,
Case 97/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1819, para. 7, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8842; INNO v.
ATAB, Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, paras. 31, 32, 42, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8442.
54. France v. U.K., Case 141/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2923, 2942, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
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What would appear to be political resolutions or conclusions
may therefore be legally binding by virtue of Article 5 if they
merely specify duties that otherwise would have resulted gen-
erally from Article 5.
IX. THE DUTY OF MEMBER STATES TO COMPLY WITH
THE "GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LA W"
BINDING ON THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS
Member States are bound by Article 5 to abstain from any
measures which could jeopardize "the objectives of the
Treaty." Under Article 164 of the Treaty, the Court must en-
sure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaty,
"the law is observed." This law includes certain "general prin-
ciples of law" with which the Community institutions must
comply: the principles of proportionality, equality, legal cer-
tainty, the principle that private parties must be heard before
decisions are made that affect their interests, the principle that
reasons must be given for decisions, so that judicial review is
possible, and others.
Perhaps compliance with the law in the interpretion and
application of the Treaty should be regarded as one of the
objectives of the Treaty, even though it is normally assumed
that the objectives referred to are only those set out in Article
3. In any case, the question arises whether, under Article 5 or
elsewhere, these "general principles of law" bind Member
States in the sphere of Community law. There is strong judi-
cial authority supporting the idea that Member States are
bound. The question came before the Court in Jongeneel
Kaas,55 but the Court avoided it in making its decision. The
Advocate General's opinion, however, clearly stated:
The... question is concerned with the general principles of
Community law, and in particular, with the principle of pro-
portionality. The national court wishes to ascertain whether
that principle is directly applicable in a case such as that
pending before it.
(CCH) 8752; Commission v. U.K., Case 804/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, 1090-91 (con-
clusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8752; Gewiese v. Mac-
kenzie, Case 24/83, 1984 E.C.R. 817, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,039.
55. Jongeneel Kaas B.V. v. Netherlands, Case 237/82, 1984 E.C.R. 483, 520,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,059; see also Hurd, Case 44/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,283.
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The answer to that question must be in the affirmative. The
general principles elicited by the Court from the primary
and secondary provisions of Community law, and in particu-
lar from those fundamental values which are common to the
legal systems of the Member States, form part of the Com-
munity legal order and may therefore be relied upon by in-
dividuals before the national court which, as is well known,
is also a Community court. However, that is subject to the
limitation that such principles may come into operation
only in cases where the application of substantive rules of
Community law is involved. To be more explicit, those
principles may be relied upon by individuals and will be
taken into account by the courts not in any circumstances
but only in cases which display some connection with the
legal order of the Community ....
The general principles of law and, in particular, the princi-
ple of proportionality have direct effect. Accordingly, they
must be applied by national courts if the circumstances in
relation to which they are relied upon display a connection
with the Community system.5"
The last phrase is important. It could not be suggested
that Article 5, or any other rule of Community law, makes
"general principles of law" binding on Member States outside
the Community law sphere. If general principles of law do
bind Member States within that sphere, it is necessary to define
more precisely when those principles apply to national meas-
ures. This Article suggests that they apply whenever Member
States are implementing Community measures or policies, are
acting in any sense on behalf of the Community, or are using
powers that the Community regulates.
In Benedetti v. Munari, the Advocate General stated that:
Member States are bound by the prohibition on discrimina-
tion in Article 40 .... This likewise follows from the judg-
ment in Case 60/75 with its reference to the fact that State
measures must not jeopardize the objectives and operation
of a common organization of the market. It may accord-
ingly be assumed that a Member State on adopting meas-
ures which effect the common organization of the market
must have regard to all principles governing this sphere,
that is including the prohibition on discrimination. Refer-
56. Jongeneel Kaas, Case 237/82, 1984 E.C.R. at 510 (opinion of the Advocate
General).
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ence may also be made to the judgment in... Van der Hulst's
Zonen v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen .... In this case the
principle of Article 40 was declared applicable by analogy to
a national intervention of the market.. .. 57
Similarly, in one of the UK fisheries cases the Court stated:
In order to safeguard the rights and interests protected by
Community law for other Member States and their nationals
it was necessary to lay down and publish all the detailed
rules for the implementation of the system chosen by the
British authorities for the implementation of Regulation
No. 1779/77 so as to enable all Member States and all per-
sons concerned, in the same way as the Community authori-
ties, to see whether the system put into operation fulfilled
both the United Kingdom's obligations under the relevant
regulation, Regulation No.1799/77, and the general re-
quirements of non-discrimination and equality as regards
the conditions of access to the fishing grounds enshrined in
Article 2 of Regulation No. 101/76 and Article 7 of the EEC
Treaty. This obligation to introduce implementing meas-
ures which are effective in law and with which those con-
cerned may readily acquaint themselves is particularly nec-
essary where sea fisheries are concerned, which must be
planned and organized in advance; the requirement of legal
clarity is indeed imperative in a sector in which any uncer-
tainty may well lead to incidents and the application of par-
ticularly serious sanctions.5 8
This ruling apparently goes beyond the provisions of any of
the Community acts referred to in the judgment, and suggests
that Member States are bound, as a result of the principle of
legal certainty, to ensure that the rights and duties of private
parties under official measures are clearly stated in published
documents. This is an extremely important principle.
In Biologische Produkten, the Court, in ruling on products
alleged to be hazardous to public health, stated:
Whilst a Member State is free to require a product of the
type in question, which has already received approval in an-
other Member State, to undergo a fresh procedure of exam-
ination and approval, the authorities of the Member States
57. Benedetti v. Munari, Case 52/76, 1977 E.C.R. 163, 188 (conclusions of the
Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8406 (citation omitted).
58. Commission v. U.K., Case 32/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2403, 2445, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8692.
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are nevertheless required to assist in bringing about a relax-
ation of the controls existing in intra-Community trade. It
follows that they are not entitled unnecessarily to require
technical or chemical analyses or laboratory tests where
those analyses and tests have already been carried out in
another Member State and their results are available to
those authorities, or may at their request be placed at their
disposal.
For the same reasons, a Member State operating an approv-
als procedure must ensure that no unnecessary control ex-
penses are incurred if the practical effects of the control car-
ried out in the Member State of origin satisfy the require-
ments of the protection of public health in the importing
Member State.59
This passage could perhaps be viewed as merely elaborating
on the Article 36 concept of "arbitrary discrimination." It is
preferable, however, to regard it as indicating that the princi-
ple of proportionality applies to national measures in the Com-
munity law sphere. In another 1982 case the Court made it
clear that Member States are bound by the principle of equal
treatment when exercising discretion granted to national au-
thorities under Community law.60
It is well established that Member States must not adopt
overly restrictive measures for the purposes mentioned in Arti-
cle 36 of the EEC Treaty.6' This obligation can be regarded as
resulting from applying the principle of proportionality to na-
tional measures or merely as a result of the rule that excep-
59. Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Producten, Case 272/80,
1981 E.C.R. 3277, 3291, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8783; Commission v. France,
Case 42/82R, 1982 E.C.R. 841, para. 24, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8931; Commis-
sion v. U.K., Case 124/81, 1983 E.C.R. 203, para. 16, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8911; Kramer, Joined Cases 3, 4 & 5/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1279, 1328 (conclusions of the
Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8372.
60. Norddeutsches VieH-UND Fleischkontor v. Balm, Will, Trawako, Joined
Cases 213-215/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3583, para. 9, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8881.
61. E.g., Commission v. Germany, Case 247/81, 1984 E.C.R. 1111, para. 7,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,075; Rivoira, Case 179/78, 1979 E.C.R. 1147, 1157,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8565; Commission v. U.K., Case 40/82, 1984 E.C.R. 283,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8911; Commission v. U.K., Case 124/81, 1983 E.C.R.
203, 235-36, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8911; Commission v. France, Case 42/82,
1983 E.C.R. 1013, 1047, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8931; Campus Oil v. Minister
for Industry & Energy, Case 72/83, 1984 E.C.R. 2727, paras. 37, 44, 47, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,069; De Peijper, Case 104/75, 1976 E.C.R. 613, para. 32, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8353; see also Luisi and Carbone, Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83,
1984 E.C.R. 377 (Article 106 of the EEC Treaty), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,038.
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tions to basic Community principles, such as free movement of
goods, must be strictly construed. Lord Mackenzie Stuart,
speaking extra-judicially, has stated that the Court applies the
doctrine of legitimate expectations to Member States.6 2
The case law of the Court also suggests that, when acting
in the Community sphere, Member States are bound by the
principle of fundamental rights included in Community law.63
If this position is correct, and this Article submits that it is in
the Community law sphere, it confirms that Member States are
bound by the "general principles of law," because there is no
reason to distinguish between the "general principles of law"
and fundamental rights principles in the narrower sense.
Outside the sphere of Community law, only national principles
of fundamental rights would apply.
Article 5 probably also binds national authorities to com-
ply with certain principles of Community legislation primarily
applicable to Community institutions, for example, the obliga-
tion to keep certain information confidential.64 National meas-
ures inconsistent with these general principles would be inva-
lid under national law, and would be a violation of the obliga-
tions of Member States under Community law. National
courts would be obliged to apply the general principles rather
than national law in case of conflict.
X. DUTIES OF MEMBER STATES IN THE SPHERE OF
EXTERNAL RELATIONS
Article 234 obligates Member States to eliminate conflicts
between the Community Treaties and treaties they have en-
tered into before they became Member States. This a specific
duty that results from Article 5, and it applies a fortiori to obli-
gations entered into after they became Member States. Under
Article 5, Member States have a duty to cease being parties to
conventions that are inconsistent with, or obligate them to act
inconsistently with, Community law.
Similarly, Article 5 and Article 228 require Member States
62. Lord Mackenzie Stuart, supra note 51, at 59.
63. Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, para. 32
(referring to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8322.
64. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 214.
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not to do anything that would cause the Community to be in
breach of its obligations under any Treaty to which it is a
party.65 Member States must refrain from any action that
would make it more difficult for the Community to pursue an
effective international negotiating position. A Member State
could breach Article 5 by prejudging or compromising the re-
sult of internal discussions on the negotiating position of the
Community, or by weakening its negotiating position in any
fashion.66 Additionally, Article 5 binds Member States to use
every legal and political means at their disposal to ensure the
participation of the Community in international conventions67
when the Community must do so in the exercise of its exclu-
sive competence, or when the Council has decided or is likely
to decide that the Community should participate. Member
States must enable the Community to exercise its powers and
therefore should not, for example, agree to the terms of a draft
convention or rules of procedure for negotiations unless they
contain provisions enabling the Community to become a party
unconditionally, or on conditions that are compatible with
Community law.68 Finally, Member States must also use every
legal and political means to ensure that the Community can
exercise its exclusive competence in international organiza-
tions.
XI. THE DUTY TO TAKE COLLECTIVE ACTION AND TO
COOPERATE WITH OTHER MEMBER STATES
The Court has repeatedly found that Article 5 imposes a
duty of solidarity on Member States.69 This implies, among
65. Kupferberg, Case 104/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3641, para. 13, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8877; EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 228.
66. Commission v. Ireland, Case 61/77R, 1977 E.C.R. 937, para. 28, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8473; Commission v. Ireland, 1978 E.C.R. 417, 468-69 (conclu-
sions of Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) -; Kramer, Joined Cases 3-
5/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1279, paras. 44-45, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8372.
67. Kramer, 1976 E.C.R. at 1311, paras. 44-45; see also Allott, Adherence to and
Withdrawal from Mixed Agreements, in MIXED AGREEMENTS 120 (D. O'Keeffe & H.
Schermers eds. 1983).
68. Feenstra, A Survey of the Mixed Agreements and their Participation Clauses, in
MIXED AGREEMENTS 207 (D. O'Keeffe & H. Schermers eds. 1983).
69. Commission v. France, Joined Cases 6 & 11/69, 1969 E.C.R. 523, paras. 16-
17 (the Court held that "the exercise of reserved powers cannot... permit the unilat-
eral adoption of measures prohibited by the Treaty"), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8105; see also id. at - (paras. 30, 41 of the judgment); Commission v. Council
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other things, a duty not to act unilaterally, as is specifically con-
firmed by Article 116 of the EEC Treaty. The Court has also
found a duty of cooperation between Member States (and not
merely with the Community institutions), inherent in the Com-
munity system, which applies when new national measures that
could create obstacles to intra-Community trade are
adopted.70
XII. THE DUTY TO CONSULT THE COMMISSION
Annex VI of the Hague Resolutions of 1976 provides for
consultation of the Commission by Member States on all pro-
posed national fishery conservation measures. Annex VI also
provides that Member States should "seek the approval" of the
Commission. The Court has ruled that this Annex "makes
specific the duties of cooperation" already imposed on Mem-
ber States by Article 5.7I In any sphere in which "worthwhile
results can only be obtained thanks to the cooperation of all
the Member States," a Member State planning to adopt na-
tional measures, even measures intended to promote an objec-
tive already recognized and accepted in principle by the Com-
munity, may have an obligation to consult the Commission and
seek its approval. Whether the Court would decide that such a
duty existed or not in any particular situation would depend on
the facts of the situation. Presumably the Court would be less
likely to find a duty to consult if neither the Council nor the
(AETR), Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263, paras. 77, 90, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8134; Kramer, Joined Cases 3-5/76, 1976 E.C.R. 1279, 1321, paras. 44-45 (conclu-
sions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8372; France v. U.K.,
Case 141/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2923, para. 8, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8609; Commis-
sion v. U.K., Case 32/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2403, para. 10, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8692.
For the limits of this rule, see Schluter, Case 9/73, 1973 E.C.R. 1135, para. 39,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8233; Rewe, Case 10/73, 1973 E.C.R. 1175, para. 26,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8234 (duty to cooperate in connection with rates of ex-
change does not give individuals rights).
70. Commission v. U.K., Case 42/82, 1983 E.C.R. 1013, 1044, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,017; Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Producten
B.V., Case 272/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3277, para. 14, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8783.
71. France v. U.K., Case 141/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2923, para. 8, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8609. In Commission v. Belgium, Case 52/84, a judgment of 15 January
1986, the Court stated that Article 5 imposes a duty of a "genuine cooperation" on
Member States and on the Commission to work together. 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,297, at -.
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Commission had requested consultation, or if the proposed
national measures would cause little inconvenience.
XIII. THE DUTY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION
To enable the Commission to fulfill its responsibilities
under Article 155 EEC of the Treaty and under Community
legislation, Article 5 imposes a duty to provide information to
the Commission. As clearly stated by the Court:
It should ... be emphasized that the Member States are
obliged, by virtue of Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to facili-
tate the achievement of the Commission's tasks which,
under Article 155 of the EEC Treaty, consist in particular of
ensuring that the provisions of the Treaty and the measures
adopted by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied. It
is for those reasons that Article 12 of the directive in ques-
tion, like other directives, imposes upon the Member States
an obligation to provide information.72
Accordingly, if the Commission believes that it needs cer-
tain information to carry out its tasks, and requests that infor-
mation from Member States, the Member States must either
provide it or challenge the Commission's power under Article
173 of the EEC Treaty to make such a request. Article 21 of
the Statute of the Court also obliges Member States, even
when non-parties, to supply "all information which the Court
considers necessary for the proceedings. 7 3
XIV. COMPETENCE RULES AND CONFLICT RULES
The Court has frequently stated that Member States no
longer have the competence to adopt national measures that
conflict with Community law or interfere with its operation.
The duty not to interfere with the operation of Community law
is derived from Article 5 as noted above, In case of conflict,
72. Commission v. Netherlands, Case 97/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1819, para. 7, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8842; France, Italy & U.K. v. Commission, Joined Cases 188-
190/80, 1982 E.C.R. 2545, 2593-94 (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8852; Commission v. Italy, Case 147/77, 1978 E.C.R. 1307, 1314
(conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8498; Judgment
of December 11, 1985, Commission v. Greece, Case 192/84, 1985 E.C.R. at - (pa-
ras. 19-20 of the judgment).
73. Statute of the Court ofJustice, art. 21. Presumably, this duty would have no
direct effect on national courts.
1987]
532 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 10:503
Community law applies. However, this phrase conceals an am-
biguity. If the rule is merely one of conflict, the use of the
word competence adds nothing. A rule concerning compe-
tence rather than conflict would be different. It would say that
Member States no longer have competence to legislate con-
cerning a specific subject matter, whether or not the legislation
conflicted with Community rules (or interfered with their oper-
ation). On several occasions the Court has used language that
does not distinguish between conflict, interference, and trans-
fer of competence. For example, two paragraphs in the
Bollmann case touch on all three concepts:
Since Regulation No. 22/62, in conformity with the second
paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty, is directly applicable
in all Member States, the latter, unless otherwise expressly
provided, are precluded from taking steps, for the purposes
of applying the regulation, which are intended to alter its
scope or supplement its provisions. To the extent to which
Member States have transferred legislative powers in tariff
matters with the object of ensuring the satisfactory opera-
tion of a common market in agriculture they no longer have
the powers to adopt legislative provisions in this field.
Therefore Article 14 of Regulation No. 22/62 is to be inter-
preted as meaning that Member States must take all steps
necessary to eliminate obstacles which may arise under their
own legislation to the application of the regulation as from
1 July 1962. This article does not therefore permit Member
States to adopt any internal measures affecting the scope of
the regulation itself.14
Analysis of competence and conflict rules is made more
complicated because many of the relevant cases involved com-
mon rules for agricultural products. For example, in Russo v.
AlMA the Advocate General used language based on compe-
tence rather than conflict:
According to a well-established line of cases, of which the
judgment of the Court of January 23, 1975, in the case of
Galli . . . is only a continuation, Member States can no
longer intervene in sectors where there is a common organ-
74. Bollman, Case 40/69, 1970 E.C.R. 69, paras. 4-5, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8098; Krohn, Case 74/69, 1970 E.C.R. 451, paras. 4-5, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8094; Toffoli v. Regione Veneto, Case 10/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3301, para. 12, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8615.
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ization of the market by adopting unilateral provisions
which are an unnecessary repetition of Community rules or
even run counter to them .... The common organization of
the market in durum wheat, which is provided for by Article
40(2) of the Treaty and was established by Regulation No
120/67, empowers the Community institutions entrusted
with the task of running it to adopt the necessary measures
to deal with price rises on the Italian market and we have
seen that these powers have been exercised by them. These
powers override any concurrent powers vested in the Mem-
ber States.
If concurrent powers of the kind at issue in this case were
permitted, that would be tantamount to retaining or reviv-
ing a national organization of the market, which by defini-
tion has been replaced by a common organization (Article
43(3) of the Treaty).75
In another agricultural case,Jongeneel Kaas, the Court, in a
ruling specifically limited to the facts of the case, held that the
common organization of the market in milk products did not
exclude national measures on the quality of cheese.76
The well-known AETR judgment, which refers specifically
to Article 5, is open to two interpretations, one concerned with
conflict, the other with competence.77 The relevant parts of
the judgment are as follows:
Under Article 5, the Member States are required on the one
hand to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment
of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions and, on the other hand, to
abstain from any measure which might jeopardize the at-
tainment of the objectives of the Treaty.
75. Russo v. A.I.M.A., Case 60/75, 1976 E.C.R. 45, 61, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8338 (citation omitted). In a narrower context, see Cucchi v. Avez, Case 77/76,
1977 E.C.R. 987, 1023, paras. 27-35 (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8422; Toffoli, Case 10/79, 1979 E.C.R. 3301, 3320-22, para. 12
("national legislation designed to promote and encourage... a uniform producer
price for milk ... is . . . outside the bounds of the powers given to Member States
... ) (conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8615. But see
Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Ass'n v. Ireland, Joined Cases 36 & 71/80, 1981
E.C.R. 735, 761-63 (Advocate General spoke only in terms of conflict and interfer-
ence), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8747.
76. Jongeneel Kaas, Case 237/82, 1984 E.C.R. 483, 515-17, paras. 12-16 (conclu-
sions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,059.
77. Commission v. Council (AETR), Case 22/70, 1971 E.C.R. 263, paras. 21,
22, 28 & 31, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8134.
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If these two provisions are read in conjunction, it follows
that to the extent to which Community rules are promul-
gated for the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, the
Member States cannot, outside the framework of the Com-
munity institutions, assume obligations which might affect
those rules or alter their scope. 7
8
This passage suggests a decision based on conflict principles.
The following passages, however, suggest a principle of com-
petence:
Although it is true that Articles 74 and 75 do not expressly
confer on the Community authority to enter into interna-
tional agreements, nevertheless the bringing into force, on
25 March 1969, of Regulation No. 543/69 of the Council on
the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to
road transport (O.J. L 77/49) necessarily vested in the
Community power to enter into any agreements with third
countries relating to the subject-matter governed by that
regulation .... These Community powers exclude the pos-
sibility of concurrent powers on the part of Member States,
since any steps taken outside the framework of the commu-
nity institutions would be incompatible with the unity of the
Common Market and the uniform application of Commu-
nity law.79
It is perhaps wise to consider that this question cannot be
answered in general terms, but only in the context of specific
situations. It is clear that competence over a complete sphere
may be transferred from Member States to the Community, as
has been done with commercial policy80 and fisheries.8 ' It also
seems clear that Community legislation could be intentionally
comprehensive or exhaustive, so as to exclude the possibility
of any national measure on the same subject matter. This in-
tent would have to be a matter of interpretation in each case,
as it was in Jongeneel Kaas and Bochsbeutel, in which the Court
stated:
It is true that, once rules on the common organization of
78. Id. at 275, paras. 21, 22.
79. Id. at 275-76, paras. 28-31.
80. Opinion of the Court given pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty of 11
November 1975, Local Cost Standard, Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8365.
81. Commission v. U.K., Case 804/79, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8752.
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the market may be regarded as forming a complete system,
the Member States no longer have competence in that field
unless Community law expressly provides otherwise .... As
regards the question of bottle shapes and the protection
which they may possibly enjoy, which is of secondary impor-
tance in relation to the fundamental principles of a common
organization of the market, it is not possible to deduce from
the provisions regarding the protection of the "flute
d'Alsace" that the Community legislation has exhausted its
competence under Article 54, mentioned above. In this re-
gard it may also be noted that negotiations have been con-
ducted at the Community level for several years with the
aim of introducing rules for protecting the Bocksbeutel bot-
tle and that to that end several draft regulations have been
prepared but without success. It thus appears that the
Community legislation protecting the "flute d'Alsace" is
not exclusive. Therefore Article 54(1) of Regulation No.
337/79 allows the rules adopted by the Member States to
be maintained in this field provided that they do not contra-
vene Article 30 et seq. of the EEC Treaty.8 2
It seems to follow that Member States no longer have
competence over a given subject matter if either (1) compe-
tence has been transferred to the Community (whether or not
it has been exhaustively exercised); or (2) the Community leg-
islation is to be interpreted as exhaustive or comprehensive. If
neither of these two conditions is satisfied, the only rules appli-
cable are rules of conflict and non-interference. In other
words, except in the two cases of exclusive Community compe-
tence, Member States no longer have competence to adopt
measures conflicting with or interfering with the operation of
Community rules, but remain competent to adopt other legis-
lation concerning the same subject matter.
In some circumstances Member States may no longer have
competence because any national measure would interfere
with the operation of Community rules or policies. This possi-
bility is suggested by the Ruling on Physical Protection of Nu-
clear Materials, 8 but there the exclusive powers of the Com-
munity were clear and did not need to be deduced from either
82. In re Prantl, Case 16/83, 1984 E.C.R. 1299, paras. 13, 16, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,089.
83. Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Ruling 1/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2151.
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the comprehensiveness of Community legislation or the risk of
conflict. Member States could only be completely preempted
if the Community legislation dealt thoroughly with the subject
matter, and the question whether the situation fell into the sec-
ond or the third category described above would usually have
little practical significance.
Competence rules, of course, always have direct effects on
national courts. The conflicts rule has direct effects as long as
the relevant rule of Community law has direct effects.
XV. RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 5:
THE DUTIES OF MEMBER STATES TOWARDS
ONE ANOTHER, AND THE DUTY OF
COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS TO
COOPERATE WITH MEMBER STATES
Article 2 of the Treaty states that various aspects of eco-
nomic expansion are Community objectives. Article 5 obli-
gates Member States to refrain from measures that could jeop-
ardize the attainment of the Community's objectives. It may
be significant, therefore, that the Court held a Member State
had failed to fulfill its obligations when it, inter alia, "adversely
affected the interests of another Member State" without suffi-
cient reason and without the consultation called for by the rel-
evant Council Resolution.84 It would not be surprising if the
Court deduced from Article 5, and from the principle of pro-
portionality, that each Member State has a duty to take no ac-
tion that could unnecessarily or unjustifiably cause harm to an-
other Member State, because the prosperity of all Member
States is a Community objective.
The Court has also recently held that the Commission has
a reciprocal duty of cooperation with Member States. 5
84. Commission v. U.K., Case 32/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2403, para. 58, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8692; Commission v. France, Case 42/82, 1983 E.C.R. 1013, para. 36,
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8931.
85. In Commission v. Belgium, Case 52/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,297, the Court stated that the Commission, as well as the Member States,
had obligations of "genuine cooperation" under Article 5 to work together to resolve
problems. In Hurd v.Jones, Inspector of Taxes, Case 44/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm.
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,283, the Court stated: "As the Court held in particular in its
judgment of 10 February 1983 .... Luxembourg v. European Parliament .. .that
provision [Article 5] is the expression of the more general rule imposing on Member
States and the Community Institutions mutual duties of genuine cooperation and
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CONCLUSION
Two acknowledgements must be made: not all of the
rules referred to above necessarily result only from Article 5,
and this Article treats what may in some cases have been inci-
dental comments as if they were fully considered and authori-
tative statements of principle. Certainly, the principles stated
in this Article will be clarified, and made subject to conditions
and exceptions, by future case law. Nevertheless, the case law
of the Court now provides an impressive number of cases in
which concrete obligations have been derived from Article 5.
No doubt there will be more.
assistance . . .if the implementation of a provision of the Treaties or of secondary
Community law or the functioning of the Communty Institution were impeded by a
measure taken to implement ... an agreement concluded between Member States
outside the scope of the Treaties ... the measure in question could be regarded as
contrary to the obligations arising under the second paragraph of Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty." Id. at - (paras. 38-39 of the judgment) (citation omitted); see also id. at
- (paras. 44-45, 48, 49 of the judgment).
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